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Together, we must draw a new circle that embraces all
the world. Together, we must draw Lecky’s circle.
This article is taken from the lecture given by James
Bacchus at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies on 10
April 2003.
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The Security Council:
an impediment to
international justice?
by Nigel White
The author doubts whether the Council could survive another crisis
of the type witnessed in Kosovo and Iraq without change.
INTRODUCTION
The crisis of 2002–2003, leading up to the application
of military force against Iraq on 20 March 2003, raised
fundamental questions over the future of the Security
Council. From the American and British perspectives the
inability of the Council to agree on a process for handling
the Iraq crisis called into question the role, if any, to be
played by the Security Council in the future. From the
French perspective (and also probably from the Russian
and Chinese perspectives) the Iraq crisis strengthened the
Security Council, by showing that it will not simply agree
to the demands of the sole remaining superpower. The
principle seemingly being upheld by France, Russia and
China, was that using force to resolve long standing
problems should only occur once all diplomatic and non-
forcible efforts to resolve the matter had been exhausted.
It certainly seemed that the process of weapons inspection,
restarted after Resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002, was
precipitously curtailed by military action.
Nevertheless, to paint the picture of a Council
protecting fundamental principles (the principle of the
non-use of force) in the Iraq crisis may seem a little rich,
given that, as with many other instances of Security
Council action and inaction, the application of principles
of law and justice is selective and inconsistent, being
dependent on the political configuration of Council
membership, particularly the P5 (five permanent
members), on any given issue. While the French
government can probably claim the moral and legal high
ground in the Iraq crisis in March 2003, how can it, along
with China, France, and also the UK, explain its
pragmatism in the case of voting for a US inspired
resolution granting immunity from the International
Criminal Court (ICC) to peacekeepers from certain
countries serving with the UN in July 2002? Of course,
pragmatists would argue that these are completely separate
issues, involving different issues of power and law. That is
certainly true, and it is to be expected in a political body.
The purpose here though, is not just to criticise the
Council for its inconsistency, but to suggest ways in which
the Council’s discretion in the maintenance of
international peace and security, and the discretion of each
permanent member in exercising the veto, can be
evaluated and perhaps regulated, so that principles of law
and justice play a more significant role in decision making
within the Council. Furthermore, the problem of inaction
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due to the Council’s collective inertia will be tackled by
considering the duties of the permanent members.
THE REALITY OF THE VETO
If the UN Charter is seen as the constitution of the
international community, embodying fundamental
principles, then as Brierly pointed out in 1946, the
presence of the veto is a significant flaw in that
constitutional edifice (1946 23 British Y.I.L. 83 at 92). For
Council action to be taken to uphold those principles,
there must be agreement amongst the P5. This represents
a realist core in the midst of an institutional framework.
Agreement or disagreement among the P5 is the key to
Security Council action or inaction, and negotiations
among this group are shaped by the presence of the veto.
Though not often wielded formally in open meetings in the
post-Cold War era, the threat of the veto shapes
negotiations as both the Iraq crisis, and the crisis over the
jurisdiction of the ICC, show.
The “unreasonable” veto spoken about by the British
Prime Minister in February and March 2003 in relation to
the French (and Russian) threats to veto a second
resolution on Iraq has no legal basis, at least in the sense
used by the Prime Minister. The French veto, though
galling to the UK, and to a lesser extent the US, and
therefore unreasonable from their perspectives, was being
threatened through a belief that the best way forward was
not through the immediate use of force against Iraq but
through a lengthier inspection process, a belief shared by
the majority of the Council, and based on a perception of
Security Council Resolution 1441. The UK felt aggrieved
that its view of Resolution 1441, that its violation should
have led to a second resolution authorising the use of force,
or even to an acceptance of the use of force following mere
discussions in the Council, was being ignored. However,
the fact was that the will of the Council had been clearly
expressed at the time of the adoption of 1441, even though
the resolution itself was somewhat opaque, to the effect
that there were no “triggers” or “automaticity” in the
resolution establishing a legal basis for the use of force
(4644th meeting of the Council, 8 November 2002). This
signified that the French interpretation of the Resolution
and the process that was to follow from it were not
“unreasonable” even in a political sense, and certainly not
in a legal sense. In the case of Iraq, the Council’s failure to
take further executive action seemed to be a product of
genuine disagreement between the permanent members.
At this stage it is worth remembering Inis Claude’s
reminder that the constitution of the Security Council
signified that it would be as much a forum for diplomacy
and negotiation as an executive body for taking police
action (in E. Luard, The Evolution of International
Organizations (1966), 66 at 87–88).
The veto is seen as a political expression of power
reserved for the Big Five and this was brutally made clear
at Yalta even before the San Francisco conference in 1945.
There seemed to be a general acceptance from that point
on that it is an exercise of power untrammelled by law, and
that is certainly the way it has been exercised since 1945.
The veto though is contained in a legal document, and is
defined in terms that signify that, formally at least, there
are legal limitations, albeit limited ones, on its use. Thus
there are Charter based legal limitations on the use of the
veto; as well as other legal limitations that can be suggested
as applicable, more de lege ferenda than de lege lata.
The current legal limitation on the power of veto is that
Article 27(3) requires that any member of the Security
Council, including a permanent member, should abstain
from voting, if a party to a dispute being dealt with by the
Council under Chapter VI. Due to its wording this
limitation appears to have been of limited relevance in
practice, but it is a legal limitation nonetheless.
Legal restrictions on the veto should of course be
extended to prevent the veto of Chapter VI resolutions per
se. This was argued by the smaller powers at San Francisco,
but that argument was lost. It has been revisited on
numerous occasions by the UN’s Open Ended Working
Group on the Question of Equitable Representation,
which has unsuccessfully tackled the issue of reform of the
Council including the veto from 1994. There is no real
reason why a permanent member should veto resolutions
proposed under Chapter VI concerning the peaceful
settlement of a dispute. The “chain of events” theory (that
a Chapter VI, or indeed a procedural, resolution might be
the first step to a Chapter VII resolution) posited at Yalta
was disreputable then and discredited now. The real
problem though is how to restrict the veto from operating
to block legitimate Chapter VII resolutions.
Is it possible to avoid the position whereby a permanent
member violates UN principles thereby causing a threat to
or breach of the peace and then prevents Council action or
even condemnation by the use of the veto? No, not while
the veto remains, for it represents the core of the veto
power, which is to prevent enforcement action being taken
against a permanent member (the negative facet of the
veto). A more practical question is how to avoid the
problem whereby a permanent member vetoes a Chapter
VII resolution for illegitimate reasons, that have nothing to
do with the issue at hand, and nothing to do with
preventing enforcement action from being taken against it?
A radical reform of the veto may seem a hopeless quest
given that amendment, whether formal or informal,
requires the consent of each permanent member.
Furthermore, to argue for more legal limitations would be
unrealistic, unless there were some mechanisms for review
of Security Council practice, including the use of the veto.
It is difficult enough for the International Court to
undertake sporadic instances of review never mind
developing a system of review. A reform of the veto would
require a radical reform of the UN to include greater
accountability, long overdue, but as far away as it has always12
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been. Nevertheless, even without formal avenues of
accountability, having clear legal limitations of the right of
veto would give substance to claims of unreasonableness,
and would, within the current system whereby world
opinion to a certain extent performs the function of
review, allow the Assembly, states, organisations and
individuals to evaluate the legality of the exercise of the
veto, as well as the consequences following from its use. In
practical terms it is unlikely that any Chapter VII action
would be taken on the basis of a vetoed Council resolution,
at least against a permanent member. But such defeated
draft resolutions may have legal effects, instead of the
current position whereby they have none. Confining the
veto to proposed Chapter VII measures that truly effect the
vital interests of a permanent member, requiring an
explanation by that permanent member, as proposed by
the Non Aligned members of the Working Group, may be
a way forward.
More drastically, but probably less realistically,
recognising that the principle of good faith applies to the
veto may add substance. Recognising the requirement that
a veto must be exercised in good faith, a principle that
Franck argues is applicable to Security Council activities
(Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995), 51–53,
219–220), may serve to prevent the pernicious use of the
veto. More realistically, as a right, power or privilege
granted to specific member states by the Charter, it can be
argued that its exercise must not violate the purposes and
principles of the UN Charter. Just as Security Council
action can be evaluated in terms of its compatibility with
fundamental principles of international law, as well as the
purposes and principles of the UN Charter, so it can be
argued, should the exercise of the veto. How many of the
Cold War vetoes would have stood up well against these
requirements? Putting good faith and the veto together in
one sentence may be going too far; but testing the veto
against the Security Council’s primary purpose, that of
maintaining peace and security, is arguably legitimate.
Furthermore, the veto should not be used to block action
that is aimed at preventing or tackling violations of
fundamental principles of international law.
Commentators have recognised that the veto is a “very
special power” (Simma, The Charter of the United Nations
(2nd ed., 2002), 508), entailing the grant of
“extraordinary decision blocking competence” (Claude,
op.cit., 71). It is suggested here that such competence
should be judged against the constitutional parameters of
the organisation, and not merely by the ordinary rules
governing voting. However, to argue that the veto is an
institutional power or right, not merely the sovereign right
of a handful of states, is contrary to the orthodoxy that
clearly states that the veto vote, like any vote in an
international body, is purely the exercise of a sovereign
right.
But times have changed, and if post-Cold War practice
is considered, where the veto is exercised with much more
caution, it may be concluded that such a limitation would
be workable. For instances of past vetoes that would have
fallen foul of the limitation, mention can be made of the
Chinese veto preventing the sending of military observers
to Guatemala in 1997 on the basis of Guatemala’s
perceived support for Taiwan. This was a short-lived
blocking of action. More serious was the Chinese veto of
the extension of the UN’s preventive deployment of troops
to Macedonia in February 1999.
In the Council chamber Macedonia stated that the
Chinese veto was based on “bilateral considerations” which
“we all consider to be in contradiction with the Charter”.
Canada also criticised China for acting out of concern for
“bilateral concerns unrelated to UNPREDEP”. The US
regretted the use of the veto stating that “the overall
interests of security in the region … should be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh other considerations”. Slovenia
stated that the failure to extend UNPREDEP’s mandate
reinforced the need to reform the veto. China at first stated
that the stability of Macedonia meant that there was no
need to extend the mandate; but later in the meeting, in
response to criticisms, stated that the accusations were
unfounded and that “deciding on the merits of an issue was
the sovereign right of every State” (3982nd meeting of the
Council, 25 February 1999).
Both of these Chinese vetoes were based on grounds
unrelated to peace and security, and could be said to be
instances of the exercise of power that were contrary to the
purposes of the UN as regards the maintenance of peace
and security. The veto of the UN Preventive Force in
Macedonia, a rare instance of UN preventive
peacekeeping, was shown to be disastrous, as that country
suffered a spillover of violence from the Kosovo crisis,
necessitating belated reactive military deployment by
NATO in September 2001. The threatened US veto in July
2002 of an extension of the mandate of the UN mission in
Bosnia, unless immunity from the ICC was granted to its
peacekeepers, could also be viewed as problematic. The
desire of the US to protect its personnel from prosecution
seemed to be unconnected to the peace and security of
Bosnia, though the threat of the veto itself did engender a
potential security crisis in that country.
However, the limitation on the veto imposed by the
UN’s purposes and principles will only catch the most
obvious abuses. Of course a balance must be achieved
between limiting the exercise of the veto and its positive
aspect, that it ensures that Council action has the support
of the most powerful members. As the debates in the
Working Group show, the veto is unlikely to be given up by
members of the P5, but they may be willing, if they wish
the Security Council containing a veto power for certain states
to have a future role, to subject it to standards that would
allow for some form of accountability for its use. 13
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THE PURSUIT OF PEACE AND JUSTICE
Though it was the veto that largely prevented Council
action during the Cold War, the recent Iraq crisis is
perhaps misleading if it suggests that current Council
inactions are mainly due to the veto. The last decade, with
the veto reduced in application, has brought to the fore the
selectivity of Council action. There has been an
unwillingness by member states to initiate or contribute to
effective action in certain conflicts, for example in Rwanda
in 1994. The current inhumane conflict in the Congo is
the current test of the Council’s resolve to deal with
conflicts that do not concern its permanent membership.
While the French and British contributed to a force sent to
the north east of the Congo in June 2003, its size (1,400)
suggests a continued lack of real commitment. This is
borne out by a leaked French military briefing document
obtained by the Guardian that was pessimistic as to the
value of the force, stating that the “operation is politically
and militarily high risk; very sensitive and complex. France
has no specific interest in the area except solidarity with
the international community” (Guardian Weekly, June
12–18, 2003, 4).
Clearly the selectivity of the Council is a major issue for
its continued credibility. This could be remedied by each
permanent member taking its responsibility for
international peace and security seriously, rather than each
being primarily concerned with threats to its peace. It is
argued here that the Council’s primary responsibility for
peace and security is the responsibility of each permanent
member. It is often recognised, not least in the rhetoric of
the permanent members, that the special position of
permanent membership entails duties, although there
needs to be specification of those duties. An inability in the
current P5 to accept their general responsibility for threats
to and breaches of the peace wherever they occur may well
be the best justification for expanding the permanent
membership to include states that can bring initiatives and
resources to the Council for dealing with conflicts in Africa
and other neglected areas of the world.
In contrast, even within its current constitutional
limitations (in the shape of the veto), and political
limitations manifested in selectivity, the Security Council
has managed to stretch its powers so that there is a
significant body of practice that seems to push against the
constitutional framework of the Charter as a whole,
indeed, in some cases arguably beyond that framework.
The point is that even a Council with these limitations has
been able to act very vigorously, if not always to the
satisfaction of some of its members.
It is not proposed here to detail legally problematic
measures taken by the Council. There has been a
continuing debate since the measures taken against Libya
in 1992 about the limitations on the competence of the
Security Council. Libya raised concerns regarding the use
or misuse of the concept of threat to the peace by the
Council, as well as the ability of the Council to override
existing treaty rights and duties of states by virtue of Article
103 of the Charter (in that case the treaty rights of Libya
to prosecute the two suspects arising under the Montreal
Convention of 1971). The issue was intensified with the
adoption of Resolution 1422 in 2002 in relation to
immunity of peacekeepers before the ICC where there was
no explicit finding of a threat to the peace in what
purported to be a Chapter VII resolution, and the Council
was not simply overriding the obligations of member states
under the ICC Statute but the obligations of the Court
itself.
Resolution 1422 also illustrates the problem of the UN’s
executive organ developing legislative supranational powers
of a general nature when the Charter only seems to provide
for lawmaking power of a specific nature, principally the
enactment of sanctions regimes against particular threats to
or breaches of the peace (in practice individual states)
under Article 41 of the Charter. The development of
general legislative powers, whether to grant immunity to
UN personnel, or to combat terrorism (as was the case
with Resolution 1373 adopted after the events of 11
September 2001), is legally controversial, bypassing as it
does the normal methods of lawmaking between states
(treaties and custom). However, in contrast to the self-
serving granting of immunity to peacekeepers from certain
states, the tackling of terrorism, the effects of which violate
individuals’ right to life and security, seems to be a positive
development. However, the Council must balance its desire
to deal with terrorists with proper respect for the human
rights of those suspected of terrorism. This concern is
applicable in the case of Security Council resolutions on
terrorism imposing sanctions against the Taliban and
Osama Bin Laden and persons and bodies associated with
him (for example Resolution 1390, 28 Jan.2002).
Pursuant to these resolutions, the Security Council’s
Taliban Sanctions Committee has listed individuals and
organisations whose funds and financial resources should
be frozen by member states without proper regard to due
process. Lack of due process in the Council, even in a
rudimentary form, is also applicable to actions taken
against individual states, which takes us back to the
measures taken against Libya from 1992.
Furthermore, there is no specific Charter provision in
Chapter VII that can expressly or implicitly be used to
justify the decision made in Resolution 1422. Article 41
has been used as the peg on which to hang new
developments by the Security Council: for example
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, and modern day protectorates in Kosovo and
East Timor. Both of these developments can be seen as
encouraging legitimate developments of the Security
Council’s concern to promote a positive peace, a peace
where protection of human rights is combined with
security. Thus they are compatible with the purposes of the
UN as developed in practice since 1945. However, it is14
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stretching Article 41 beyond breaking point to see the
immunity of certain personnel serving in UN forces as a
“measure not involving the use of armed force”. It is
certainly not a “measure” in the sense of economic or
diplomatic sanctions, or even international criminal
tribunals or fourth generation style peacekeeping
operations.
CONCLUSION
The Security Council is a political body, this is not only
reflected in its chequered history in the realm of collective
security, but also by its make-up and the wide discretion
given to it in the UN Charter. In such a body it is inevitable
that a member or group of members wanting it to act in a
certain way must persuade the remaining members to its
way of thinking. In contrast to the failed proposed second
resolution against Iraq, the United States won the
argument in the case of Resolution 1422. Should this mean
the end of the matter since in the words of the
International Court in the Namibia opinion “a resolution of
a properly constituted organ of the United Nations which
is passed in accordance with that organ’s rules of
procedure, and is declared by the President to have been so
passed, must be presumed to have been validly adopted”
(ICJ Rep. 1971, 16 at para.20)? However, sole reliance on
that presumption without any accompanying attempt to
address the underlying legal problems with the resolution,
undermines the legitimacy of the Council. The Council is
a political body, with wide discretionary powers, but that
discretion is granted to it by a legal document, the UN
Charter. Discretion should and can be exercised in
accordance with the law. As early as 1948 the International
Court stated in the Admissions opinion that the “political
character of an organ cannot release it from the observance
of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when
they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its
judgment” (ICJ Rep. 1948, 57 at 64).
The Council, even with the limitation of the veto, has
taken measures that may be questionable in terms of the
Charter and undermine the development of peace and
security based on respect for human rights, or what could
more widely be termed the pursuit of international justice.
On the other hand its development of international
criminal tribunals and fourth generation type peace
support operations illustrates how the Council can develop
its powers to promote a positive peace. The dominant
desire in the international community for the UN to play
the leading role in post-conflict Iraq, reflects the unique
legitimacy of the UN in this role, developed by its practice
in Kosovo and East Timor. The Security Council’s
endorsement of a post-conflict coalition of the willing in
Iraq (in Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003) is a positive
development in the sense that it at least shows a
recognition of the legitimacy that such authority confers by
those states previously questioning the relevance of the
Council. It is a less appealing development given that the
role of the UN in the post-conflict stage is much reduced,
though Afghanistan also manifested a downplaying of the
UN’s role in post-conflict administration. Resolution 1483
does though make it clear that the US and UK must act
consistently with the Charter and other principles of
international law in post-conflict Iraq.
Has the Iraq crisis left the Council hanging on to its role
by a thread? Although it seems to be business as usual after
the adoption of Resolution 1483, it may be doubted
whether the Council could survive another crisis of the
type witnessed in Kosovo and Iraq. Without change that
thread may break and the Council’s relevance will be much
reduced. With change – which has to be driven by the
permanent members limiting their right of veto,
recognising their responsibilities for peace wherever it is
ruptured, and proposing resolutions and measures that
accord with the Charter and fundamental principles of
international law – it stands a chance of performing a
central role in maintaining peace and securing justice.
• This article is based on a lecture given in the issues in
international justice series at the Institute of Advanced
Legal Studies on 30 April 2003
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